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INTRODUCTIOVN
Without a doubt, the entry into force of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Charter") is a
major legal innovation of the Lisbon Treaty and will have a
significant impact on the constitutionalization of the European
Union legal order in the long run. Some observ ers comment
that the way in which the European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or
"Court") will conduct its jurisprudence vis4-vis the Charter
might ultimately answer the question of the Union's finalite in
the daily practice of the European Court. In that sense, the far-
reaching standardization in the substantive law of federal
entities resulting from the jurisprudence of constitutional courts
in the respective federal states was cited as a negative example in
the Convention on the Charter.1 For others, the Charter will
give the Court the necessary impetus to become a fully
developed constitutional court. In any event, the jurisprudence
of the Court on the Charter will be closely followed by the
constitutional courts of the Member States and the political
institutions of the European Union, which are both rather
reluctant to see a far-reaching constitutionalization of the
European legal order, even if for quite different reasons.) The
1. In particular, the experiences of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the United States wer cCited. See William Joseph Wagner, The Role of Basic Values in
the Contempora Constitutiohnal Hermeneutics of Germany and the Lnited States, 56
ZEITSCHRIFT FICR AUSIANDISCHES OFFENTIICHES RECHT UNI) VO1KERRFCHT 178, 189
(1996); Ludwig Weber, Grundreetsschutz in Kanada-- ng'eschriebene Grundrechte und die
kanadische Bill of Rigts, 40 ZLITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES REHT LIND
VOLKERRECHT 727,746 (1980).
2. See Thomras von Danwitz, Grundfragen etner Voassungsbin dung der Europdischen
Lnion, 58JURISTEN ZLLTUN( 1125, 1125-27 (2003).
3. While the constitutional courts of the Member States fear that their autonomy
and heir competency could be evaded, the institutions are hesitant to see their ability
to legislat iore strongly restricted by the Charter of Fundamllcldl Rights of the
European Union ("Charter") than on the basis of the Jurisprudence of the ECJ.
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European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") will be a
collaborator and have a profound interest in this endeavor. In
the meantime, the relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR
might become even more complex as a result of the European
Union's accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights ("ECHR").
Given the importance of the substantive issues at stake and
the institutional stakeholders involved in the evolution of the
Charter rights, it appears quite natural to follow the
jurisprudence of the Court very closely. Even though the
Charter came into force only two years ago, the Court has
already delivered quite a significant number of judgments4 in a
great variety of fields of substantive law, particularly in matters of
social policy, free movement of persons, the status of refugees,
and EU citizenship. 5 In particular, the Court is faced with all the
major questions involved in the practical application of the
Charter via horizontal effect. In order to improve the
understanding of the ongoing process it might be helpful to give
an overview of the essential questions with which the national
courts and the ECJ are faced.
I. TO START OFF: TIE QUESTION OF APPLICABILITY
Certainly, the application of the Charter requires its
applicability ratione temporis and ratione materiae. Even though
the Court has dealt extensively with the question of applicability
of the Charter in only a small number of judgments, it is obvious
that these questions have to be answered implicitly in the
affirmative before the Court may move onto an interpretation of
the Charter rights. The Court has not yet ruled explicitly on the
applicability ratione temporis, which is not subject to a specific
4. Between December 1, 2009 and November 1, 2011. the Court delivered fifty-
three decisions in which the Charter was cited.
5. See, e.g., Runcvi-Vardyn v. Vilniaus Micsto Savivaldybes Adninistraciia, Case C-
391/09, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered May 12, 2011) (not yet reported); McCarthy v.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered May
5, 2011) (not yet reported); Sayn-Witgenstein v. von Wicn, Case C-208/09, [2010]
E.C.R. I (delivered Dec. 22, 2010) (not yet reported); Land Baden-Vfrttemberg v.
Tsakouridis, Case C-145/09, 2010] E.C.R I (delivered Nov. 23, 2010) (not yet
rcported); Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D, Joined Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09,
[2010] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 9, 2009) (not yet reported); Cha[Zi v. lkonomikon,
Case C-149/10, [2010] E.C.R. 1-8489.
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provision of the Charter. Nonetheless, the Court has examined
the validity of legislative acts that entered into force before
December 1, 2009, and that are still in effect after that date, in
light of the Charter, thereby implicitly assuming the applicability
of the Charter to such acts. This rationale also should apply to
administrative acts that have permanent effect, even if they have
been issued before that date. To the contrary, in principle, the
applicability of the Charter should be denied in situations that
have become definitive in law before the Charter's entry into
force.
The applicability of the Charter ratione materiae is governed
by Article 51 of the Charter.6 According to Paragraph 1 of this
Article, the Charter applies, on one hand, to the institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union and, on the
other hand, to the Member States only when they are
implementing EU law. While the European Union and its
institutions are clearly bound by the Charter, the extent of the
Charter's applicability with respect to the Member States is
much less evident.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE CHAR TER TO MLMBER STA TES
In order to understand the scope of application of the
Charter with regard to Member States it is essential to consider
the teleology and the wording of Article 51 of the Charter as
well as the related explanations, and especially the genesis of
this Article. 7 These elements show that the Charter applies to
Member States only when they are "implementing Union law'"8
6. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51, 2010 O.J C
83/389. at 402 [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
7. Id. art. 51; see GUY BRAIBANT. LA CHARTE DES DROITS FONDAMNENTAUX DE
L'UNION EUROPfENNE: TEMOIGNAGE ET COMMENTAIRES 251-53 (2001) (providing the
teleology of Ai ticle 51 fron the perspective of the vice-president of the Convention and
incinber of the group of five who drafted the Charter); Clemens Ladenburger, Artikel
51 &RCh (Art.Ii-II VVE) Anwendung-sbereich, in K(01 NER GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMIMENTAR Z -R
EUROPASCHLN GRUNDRLCHTL-CHARTA 759. 764-65. 1 20-23 (Peter J. Tettinger &
M~aus Stern eds., 2006) (explaining the wording and teleology of Article 51 fi om the
perspective of a member of the legal service of the European Commission, a member
who was on a secondment at the secretariat of the drafting convention).
8. For different views onil the significance of this expression, see especially Part
11.C-I).
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and does not apply to national legislation that is within the sole
competence of the Member States.9
A. Teleolo, fArticle 51 of the Charter
From a teleological point of view, the underlying purpose
of the Charter is to include within a single, easily
understandable document a catalogue of fundamental rights
that limits the authority of the European Union, its bodies and
institutions, and the exercise of their authority in the same way
in which, at the national level, the authority of Member States is
bound by the fundamental rights included in their respective
constitutions. Therefore, the function of the Charter is to
ensure, in the first place, that the European Union, its bodies
and its institutions, are constitutionally bound by a catalogue of
fundamental rights, which will be applied and enforced by the
Court. This catalogue of fundamental rights equally applies to
Member States. But it has to be kept in mind that there are
three different systems of protection of fundamental rights that
apply to Member States-their own national system of
fundamental rights,10 the ECHR, and the Charter. The Charter,
however, only applies to Member States when they are
implementing EU law. To the contrary, when the act in question
is a state act within the competence of the Member States, they
are bound by their own system of fundamental rights as well as
by the ECHR.
This plurality of systems of protection of fundamental rights
highlights the need for a clear-cut delimitation of the respective
fields of application of these systems in order to preempt
eventual conflicts between them and the institutions that carry
them out-that is to say, the national constitutional courts andd
the ECtHR on one hand, and the ECJ on the other. In this
regard, one must note that the function of the Charter is not to
enable harmonization of the systems of protection of
fundamental rights of Member States. In other words, the
9. See Florence Benoit-Rohmier, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de I'Union
europee, 19 RLCULIL LL DALLOZ 1483, 1490 (2001): jean-Paul jacqud. La demarche
r;tie, par le Consei{ eropn de Cologre, 12 REVUE U NIVERSEI IE DFS L)ROITS f)F 1L'HOMME
3, 6 (2000).
10. For tederally sUuctured Member StaLeS, such as Germany, there IighL even be
a second internal level of fundamental rights protection.
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Charter does not establish a minimum standard generally
applicable to Member States like the ECHR does. The Charter
has not been elaborated by the necessity to create such a
standard, but rather by a genuine demand for a uniform
application of EU law. For the Union, it is clear that EU law
cannot be interpreted and applied in conformity with, and
according to, different requirements under national standards
of protection of fundamental rights. This is all the more true for
questions dealing with the validitv of EU law. To do otherwise
would create the risk of having twenty-seven different standards
of protection of fundamental rights within the European Union,
and therefore a heterogeneous application of the EU law.
As important as the respect for a uniform application of EU
law in Member States is, it appears evident from the point of
view of the Court that the obligation of Member States to
respect the provisions of the Charter necessitate that a national
measure implements EU law. Therefore, the Charter is not
intended to overlap with national constitutional provisions" or
duplicate the general system of protection of fundamental rights
found in the ECHR.12
B. The Aleaning ofArticle 51 of the Charter
As regards the wording of Aiticle 51 of the Charter, on one
hand, the use of the term "only'" , in relation to Member States
is unequivocally clear. On the other hand, the use of such a
categorical term is unusual within EU law. Moreover, the
wording of Article 51 is further clarified by the reference in
Paragraph 1 to the limitations of competence that the Charter
only applies "with due regard for the principle of subsidiaritv,"
"in accordance with their respective powers," and "respecting
the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the
11. See Benoit-Rohmer, supra note 9, at 1490; Jean-Paul jacquc, La charte des droits
fJonda enta x de l'inion eawpr ne: Aspects juridiques ger&uax, 14 REIJ UE FUROPfENNE
DE DROIT PUBLIC 107, 110 (2002); see also CoLmission Communication to Member
States on the Legal Nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, COM (2000) 644 Final, at 5, 9 (Oct. 2000).
12. See Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 765. [ 24.
13. The French version "uniquemcint" and the Gerinan version "ausschliesslich"
are even stronger.
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Treaties.' 4 Similarly, in Paragraph 2, there are references to the
neutrality of the Charter concerning the divsion of
competencies between the European Union and Member States.
According to this paragraph, the Charter, firstly, does not
"extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers
of the Union," secondly, does not "establish any new power or
task for the Union," and thirdly, does not "modify powers and
tasks as defined in the Treaties."1 5
In the explanations related to the first sentence of Aiticle
51(1), which refer to the decisions of the Court in Wachauf v.
Bundesart Jir Erniihrung und Forstwirtschafi, Elliniki Radiophonia
Tileorassi AE (ERT AE) v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis (DEP)
("ERTT"), and Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia,16 it is
stated that the scope of application of the Charter follows
"unambiguously from the case-law of the Court of Justice that
the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the
context of the Union is only binding on the Member States
when they act in the scope of Union law' as confirmed by the
decision in Karlsson.17
C. The Genesis of Article 51 of the Chater
During the drafting of the Charter, several different
proposals pertaining to the application of the Charter to
Member States were put forward and discussed.18 The proposals
provided, in chronological order, that the provisions of the
Charter be "binding on the Member States only where the latter
14. Charter of Rights, sup) note 6, art. 51(1), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 402; see Sacha
Prechal. Competence Creep and Gene- Pinciples of Law, 3 REV. EUR. XDMIN. I . 5, 20
(2010).
15. Charter of Rights, spra note 6, art. 51(2), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 402.
16. See Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia, Case C-309/96, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-7493; Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT AE) v. Dimotiki Etairia
IPliroforissis (DEP), Case C-260/89. [1991] E.(.R. 1-2925; Wachautf v. Bundesatn fIr
Erinihrtung und Forstwirtschaft, Case C-5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1-2609.
17. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 OJ. C
303/17, at 32 [hereinalter Charter Explanations]; see Karlsson & Others, Case C,
292/97, [2000] E.(.R. 1-2737, 37.
18. See BRAIBANT, supra note 7, at 251; Martin Borowsky, Artikel 51 (Art. I1II
EurVerf)), in CHARTA DER GRUNDRLCHTL DER EUROPdSCHLN UNiON 531, 534 (Jfirgen
Meyer ed., 2d ed. 2006); Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 764, 20.
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transpose or apply the law of the Union," 19 "applicable.. .to
Member States when implementing Community law,"2U
"addressed... to the Member States exclusively within the
framework of implementing Community law,"'2 1  or
"addressed.. .to the Member States exclusively within the scope
of Union law".'22 This last proposal was strongly criticized by
certain members of the Convention for being vague and too
broad.23 Consequently, the Convention went back to the use of
"implementation, " 2 4  which was perceived as being more
restrictive25 and able to limit the scope of application of the
Charter and better affirm the principle of subsidiarity.2 Certain
members of the Convention expressed their concern that the
scope of application of the Charter could be considered too
broad;27 therefore, the reference to the Annibaldi decision of the
Court was included in the explanations. 2 Thus, the mere fact
that a national measure falls within a field in which the
European Union has powers may not lead to the applicability of
the Charter.29
19. See )raft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charte
4123/1/00 Rev.1, Convent 5, at 9 (Feb. 15. 2000). This proposition was accompanied
by the following commentary: "It is intended to indicate clearly that the Charter's
scope is restricted to the European Union and to avoid any application to the Member
States when they are acting within their own jurisdiction." Id.
20. See )raft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charte
4149/00, Convent 13, at 2 (Mar. 8, 2000).
21. See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Charte
4235/00, Convent 27, at I (Apr. 18, 2000).
22. See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charte
4316/00, Convent 34, at 9 (May 16, 2000).
23. See BRAIBANT, supra note 7, at 251; Borowsky, supra note 18, at 534;
Ladenburger, supra note 7. at 764.
24. See the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charte
4373/00, Convent 40, at 5 (June 23, 2000) and the )raft Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union. Charte 4422/00, Convent 45, at 15 july 28. 2000)
where the final version was proposed.
25. See BRAIBANT, supra note 7, at 251; Borowsky, supra note 18, at 534; see also
Ladenburger, supra note 7. at 764.
26. See Guy Braibant, La Charte des droitsfondamentaux, 2001 DROIT SOCLAL 73.
27. The discussions concerning the scope of application of the Charter also
included proposals that the reference to Member States should be completely
removed. See Borowsky, supra note 18, at 533.
28. See Charter Explanations, supra note 17, at 32; see also ILadenburger, supra note
7, at 764 n.39.
29. See Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comnnuic di Gnidonia, Case C-309/96, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-7493, 11 13-24; Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 766, 29.
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In this context, it also must be noted that at the time of a
hearing, in front of the second working group of the
Convention, the Director-General of the European
Commission's Legal Service rejected as unfounded the concern
that the Charter would have too broad of a scope with regard to
national legislative and administrative measures, due to the final
wording of the Charter. ° According to the European
Commission ("Commission"), fundamental rights are applicable
to national measures only in two situations put forth in the
decisions of W/achauJ,3' where they apply or implement EU law,
and ERT 12 where the Member State may restrict a fundamental
freedom on grounds of public order, public security, or public
health. According to the Commission, even if the Court
admittedly used a rather general formula to designate the
situations where Member States must respect fundamental rights
"within the scope of Community law," in practice it limited the
application of fundamental rights only to two situations
mentioned above as confirmed by the Annibaldi decision. In its
analysis of the applicability of the Charter, the Court would
require the existence of a national measure specifically
transposing or implementing EU law and would not consider it
sufficient that a Member State simply acted within the scope of
EU law. As a result, in practice, fundamental rights would only
apply to a limited number of national legislative or
administrative measures, as confirmed by the use of the
expression "when they are implementing Union law." The
Commission considers this expression more comprehensible
and less susceptible to a broad interpretation. 33
D. Relevance of the Existing Case Law
If this aforementioned position of the Commission clearly
and assuredly illustrates the scope of application of this
30. See European Convention Working Group Ii, Brussels, Beig., Sept. 5. 2002.
Jncopor(ation of the Ch(arIelAccession to the ECHR, at 41 (2002), ((ilable at
ittp://curopean-convention.cu.int/docs/wd2/1821 .pdt.
31. See Wachauf v. Bundesamt ffir Erndhrung und Forstwirtschaft. Case C-5/88,
[1989] E.C.R. 1-2609, 1 19.
32. See Elliniki Radiophonia Tildorasi AE (ERT) v. Ditnotiki Etairia Pirofoirissis
(DEP), Case C-260/89. [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925. [ 24.
33. See European Convention Working Group |I, supra note 30, at 39-41.
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provision, as demonstrated by the conclusions and
commentaries on the issue, the question arises as to whether,
according to the intention of the authors of the Charter, the
application of this provision is limited to the situation put
forward by Wachauf and therefore whether the Charter only
applies to Member States when they implement Union law in
the strict sense of the term, meaning when they transpose a
directive or implement a regulation?4 Furthermore, it is debated
whether the application of Article 51 of the Charter only covers
the situations put forward in Wachauf and ERT,35 or finally
whether it extends beyond the scope of the situations envisioned
in those lines of case law and applies in addition to the scope of
application of general principles of Union law found in the
Court's case law, which is considerably broader in scopeA
So far, the decisions of the Court regarding Article 51 (1) of
the Charter do not specifically relate to these questions and thus
do not provide a definitive conclusion regarding this matteri 7 It
34. Therefore, it is supported that the jurisprudence in Eliniki Radiphonia
Tileorasi AE (ERT) v. Dirnotiki Etairia Plroforissis (DEP) ("ERT") should be considered as
"abandoned" and not applicable vis--vis the Charter. See Borowsky, supra note 18, at
541. According to others. if the members of the Convention chose a wording that was
more restrictive, it is not clear that their intention was to return to the jurisprudence in
ERT. See Jacqu, spra note 11, at 111.
35. See, e.g, Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega Spielhallen und
Autonatenauistelungs-(mbH v. Oberbirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case -
36/02. [2004] E.C.R. 1-9611, [ 55 n.29: EU NETWORK OF INDEP. EXPERTS ON
FUNDAAMLNTAL IGHTS, COMMENTARY OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAIENTAL RIGHTS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 393 (2006); HANS-NERNER RENGEIING & PETER SZCZEM-I A,
EL ROPEAN LEGA STUDIES INST., GRUNDRECHTIE IN DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION 295
(2004); Gilles de Kerchove & Clemens Ladenburger, Le Point de Vue DActeurs de la
Convention, in LA CHARTE DES DROITS FONDAMENTA X DE I 'UNION EUROPEENNE, SON
APPORT k LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DL L'HOMME EN EUROPE 21 3, 215-16 (Jean Yves
Carlier & Olivier de Schutter eds., 2002); Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 765, [ 23.
36. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Scattolon v. Ministero dell'Istruzione,
dcll'Univcrsita c della Ricerca, Case (-108/10. [2011] E.C.R. 1 , 118 (delivered
Apr. 5, 2011) (not yet reported); TAKIS TRIDNLAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES O EU LAW
363 (2d ed. 2006); Koen I enaerts &Jose A. Gutierrez-Fons, The ConstitutionalAllocaton
of Powers and General Principles of EL Law, 47 COMMON MKT. I. REV. 1629, 1657-60
(2010).
37. Se Dereci v. Bundesministerium, Case C-256/ 1, [2011] E.C.R. I 71-
72 (delivered Nov. 15, 2011) (not yet reported); Gueye & Sahncr6n Sanchez, Joined
Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10, [2011] E.C.R. I , [ 69 (delivered Sept. 15. 2011) (not yet
reported); Rossius v. ltat Belge, Joined Cases C-267-268/ 10, [2011] E.C.R. I
[[ 16-20 (delivered May 23, 2011) (not yet reported); (harty v. Belgian State, Case C-
457/09, [2011] E.(C.R I 1 122-26 (delivered Mar. 1, 2011) (not yet reported);
DEB Deutsche Energiehandels-und Beratungsgesellschaft v. Bundesrepublik
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should be noted, however, that the Court stated recently,
referring to the wording of Article 51 of the Charter, that the
Charter should be taken into consideration only for the purpose
of interpreting the regulation in question.38 Furthermore, the
Court also held that the Charter was not applicable to a question
raised by the relevant case that did not fall within the scope of
the applicable secondary EU law. '
The applicability of the Charter ratione materiae is
particularly important given the fact that the explanations to the
Charter use the expression of Member States acting "in the
scope of Union law" to explain the field of application of the
Charter, while the Convention rejected the same expression and
replaced it with the term "when they are implementing" for the
wording Article 51(1). In addition, the Court uses these terms
for different purposes in different situations. The use of the
terms "implementing Union law" and "acting within the scope
of Union law" does not simply bring up an argument on
terminology, but actually raises questions about the significance
of these terms when used in a particular context.40
It follows from what has been discussed above that the
Charter applies to Member States when they are implementing
EU law, in other words, when they are acting as a part of the
decentralized administration of the Union and applying or
implementing a regulation, transposing a directive, or executing
a decision of the Union or a judgment of the Court (WachauJ).
Additionally, the Charter applies to Member States when they
restrict a fundamental freedom (ER). 4 1 These elements do not
Deutschland, Case C-279/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1- , 30-31 (delivered Dec. 22, 2010)
(not yet reported); Estov v. Ministerski savet na Republika Bulgaria, Case C-339/10,
[2010] E.C.R. I 11 12-14 (delivered Nov. 12, 2010) (not yet reported); Vino
Cosimo )amiano v. Poste Italiane SpA, Case C-20/10, [2010] E.C.R. 1 , 1 52
(delivered Nov. 11. 2010) (not yet reported); J.McB. v. L.E., Case C-400/10. [2010]
E.C.R. I , 11 51-52 (delivered Oct. 5 , 2010) (not yet reported); Rodrfguez Mayor v.
Herencia Yacente de Rafael de las Heras Ddvila, Case C-323/08, [2009] E.C.R. 1-11621,
58-59.
38. SeejiXcB., [2010] E.C.R. I 1 [51-52.
39. See Gue, [2011] E.C.R. 1 , 1 69.
40. See Thomas von Danwitz, Grundrechtsschutz im Anwendungsbereich des
Gerneinschaftsrechts nach der Charta de Grudrechte, in MATTHAs HERDEGEN ET AL.,
STAATSRECHT t ND POLITIK: FESTSCHRIFT T: R ROMAN HERZOG ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 19,
24-29 (2009).
41. The application of this jurisprudence is justified by the fact that when a
Member State restricts a lundamental freedom, it applies, in principle, EU law, and an
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allow for the conclusion that the Convention intended to limit
the scope of application of the Charter to the situation
envisioned in WachanJ and abandon the one put forward by
ERT 42 Beyond these two cases, the explanations support the
conclusion that the Charter does not apply to Member States
when they act within the scope of the powers of the European
Union without there being a specific link between the national
measure in question and EU law (Annibaldi).43
In that context, the question has been raised as to whether
this understanding of Article 51 of the Charter and the
explanations established by the presidency of the Convention
are fully compatible with the existing case law of the Court. In
particular, the judgments Catpenter v. Secretaiy of State4 and KB.
v. Nlational Health Service Pensions Agency1 5 have been mentioned
in this context. Nonetheless, a closer look at these judgments
reveals that the Court used a perfectly orthodox approach in
both. In conformity with ERT, the application of Article 8 of the
ECHR in Carpenter, was triggered by the freedom to provide
services. On the other hand, the application of Article 12 of the
ECHR in KB. resulted from the applicability of Article 141 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"), and, thereby, followed the national implementation
approach in Wachauf If these judgments have been criticized, it
has been for the extensive interpretation of the directly
applicable substantive EU law provision, but not for a departure
from the constructive approach under Wachauf and ERT. In
consequence, these judgments do not pose a problem in terms
of the interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter, but in terms of
the substantive EU law. In that later respect, the recent case law
seems to follow a more cautious approach. 4
examination of the respect for the principle of proportionality is difficult to accomplish
without taking into consideration fundamental rights, especially when balancing
interests of the parties.
42. See de Kerchove & I adenburger, supra note 35, at 215.
43. See Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 765-66. [ 25-28.
44. Case C-60/00, [2002] ECR 1-6305.
45. Case - 117/01, [2004] EUR 1-568.
46. See.J.McB. v. L.E.. Case C-400/10. [2010] E.C.R. I (delivered Oct. 5, 2010)
(no[ yet reportedl); see also Gueye & Salncr6n Sanchez, Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-
1/10, [20111 E.C.R. I (delivered Sept. 15, 2011) (not yet reported).
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It also seems clear from the discussions during the
Convention that the jurisprudence of the Court on
nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality, 47 which also uses
the term "within the scope of application of Union law" to
determine the applicability of Article 18 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"), cannot be
invoked to determine the applicability of the Charter.48 The use
of this term in the jurisprudence on nondiscrimination on
grounds of nationality is explained by the specific situation
envisioned by Article 18 of the TFEU and thus cannot be
transposed upon the question at hand.4 - Furthermore, this
jurisprudence was not taken into account in the drafting of the
Charter and was not mentioned in the explanations. Moreover,
an application of the jurisprudence on nondiscrimination on
grounds of nationality would considerably broaden the scope of
application of the Charter. This broadening would in particular
contradict the concerns voiced at the drafting of Aiticle 51 with
respect to limiting the scope of the Charter's application to
Member States and would go beyond the situations put forward
by WachauJ and ERT.50
E. Consequences
Nonetheless, in practice, a prudent approach to the scope
of application of the Charter should not lead one to think that
only a small number of cases will fall under the Charter. As it
results from the reference to Wachan/fand ERTby the authors of
the Charter, all cases that involve national measures determined
47. See, e.g, Trojani v. Centre Publique d'Aide Sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS), Case
C-456/02. [2004] ECR 1-7573; Martfnez Sala v. Bayern, (-85/96, [1998] ECR 1-2691;
Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschalt & Kraul v. EML Electrola GmbH, Joined Cases C-
92/92 & C-326/92, [1993] ECR 1-5145.
48. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 18, 2010 0J. C 83/01, at 56: see de Kcrchove & Ladenburger, supra note 35,
at 216; Piet Eeckhout, The EL Charter of Fr dae ntal Rights amr'd the Federal Question, 39
(OMMON MKT. L. REV. 945, 969 (2002); Francis G.Jacobs, Human, Rghts in the European
(Tion: The Role of the Court ofJustice, 26 EuR. L. RLV. 331, 337 (2001); Ladenburger,
supra note 7, at 766, 1 29.
49. See Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 766, 29.
50. See Eeckhout, supra note 48, at 969:Jacobs, supra note 48, at 336-41.
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by obligations under Union law will fall within the Charter's
scope.51
There are many examples of the application of the Charter
in such a way,52 one being that the Charter will apply to all
national administrative measures that specifically implement EU
law. In this context, measures that simply concern an area
covered by a regulation of the European Union without being
specifically controlled by that regulation do not fall within the
scope of the Charter. 53 Moreover, the Charter does not apply to
national legislation even though it is enacted in the context of
the transposition of an EU directive in so far as it transcends
what is regulated by the directive.54 As for national judicial rules,
the Charter applies to the judicial protection of a right that an
individual invokes under EU law.55 It is the same when national
authorities or courts apply national procedural rules in
accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of
Member States and in the absence of a specific EU regulation.5
The mere fact that a procedural rule of the EU is pertinent in
the context of a legal proceeding cannot entail the general
applicability of the Charter to the resolution of that particular
dispute.57 With regard to rules of competition, the measures that
the European Union takes based on Articles 101, 102, and 106
to 108 of the TFEU are subject to the Charter, whereas that, in
principle, is not the case with Member State interventions that
give rise to control by the European Union in accordance with
these articles.
51. See Melki & Abdeli, joined Cases C 188-189/10, [2010] E.C.R. 1-5667, 1 56.
52. See, e.g., Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 768-71. [ 35-50.
53. See Criminal Proceedings Against.Jean-Louis Maurin, Case C-144/95. [1996]
E.C.R. 1-2914, 12; see also Gueye & Sahneron Sdnchez, joined Cases C-483/09 & 1/ 10,
[2011] E.C.R. I , 1[ 69 (delivered May 12, 2011) (not yet reported).
54. See Ladenburger, supra note 7, at 766, 1 29.
55. See id. at 768.
56. See Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, Joined Cases 317-20/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-
2213. 61: see also Sacha Prechal & Rob Widdershoven, ffectiveess or Effective Judicial
Protection: A Poo)y A-ialated Reationship, in TODAY'S M: ITILAYRED ILEGAL ORDER:
( URRLNT ISSULS AND PERSPLCTATVS 283, 293 (Tristan Baume eL al. eds., 2011).
57. See.J.McB. v. L.E., Case C-400/10. [2010] E.C.R. I , [51-52 (delivered
Oct. 5, 2010) (not yet reported).
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111. THE DIST\INCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES
The preamble and the second sentence of Article 51 (1) of
the Charter explicitly introduce the distinction between "rights"
and "principles." Article 52(5) clarifies the judicial nature of
these "principles." 8 The wording of Article 52(5) of the Charter
and the relevant explanations are confirmed by the genesis of
this provision, and of Article 51(1) second sentence, which
appears particularly significant.
Article 52 (5) provides that principles "may be
implemented" by the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies
of the European Union, as well as Member States when they
implement EU law in the exercise of their respective powers,
and that these principles "shall be judicially cognisable only in
the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their
legality." 59 The explanations related to Article 52 of the Charter
refer to Article 51(1) and state that "subjective rights shall be
respected, whereas principles shall be observed.'" 0 Furthermore,
the explanations refer to the jurisprudence of the Court61 as well
as the approach of the Member States' constitutional systems
that are relevant to "principles," particularly in the field of social
rights, and state that principles "do not however give rise to
direct claims for positive action by the Union's institutions or
Member States authorities. 162
The distinction between "rights" and "principles"-
mentioned in the preamble of the Charter and the second
sentence of Article 51 (1) (,Article 11-111 (1) of the Constitutional
project)-played an important role during the drafting of the
Charter.b - In this regard, the Convention was especially
58. The Court has not yet adjudicated on the distinction betcCn rights and
principles.
59. Charter of Rights, supra note 6, art. 52(5), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 403.
60. Charter Explanations, supra note 17, at 35.
61. See Pfizer Animal Health SAv. Council, Case T-13/99, [2002] E.C.R. II-3305;
Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV & Van Dijk Food Products (Lopkik) BV v. Enr. Econ.
Cna., Case 265/85. [1987] E.C.R. 1169.
62. Charter Explanations, supra note 17, at 35
63. See Cleetnins Ladenburger, Artikel 52 GRCh (Art. II -112 ViE) Tragiveite und
Auslegung der Rechtc und Grundsdtze, in KOLNER GEMLINSCHAFTSKOMMLNTAR ZUR
Et ROPAISCHEN (RUNDRECHITE-CHARTA, supra note 7, at 774, 780, 6; see also Sacha
Prechal, Rights v. Principles, or How to Remove Fundamental Rights firom the Jurisdiction of
the Courts, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AN ONGOING PROCESS OF INTEGRATION 177, 179
(Steven Blockmans et al. eds., 2004).
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influenced by Spanish constitutional law, particularly Article
53 (3) of the Spanish Constitution concerning the justiciability of
the guiding principles of social and economic policy.64 The
Convention also was influenced by French constitutional law,
which features a distinction between rights that are fully
justiciable and "principles of constitutional value" that do not
give the individual persons a right to commence an action and
only permits the constitutional council to determine whether
the legislature took measures that are contrary to such
principles.65 This distinction between "rights" and "principles"
should reduce the divergence between constitutional traditions
of Member States to a common denominator.66 It served as a
compromise during the intense and controversial discussions at
the Convention regarding standards that contained subjective
rights and those that only contained objective rights, particularly
in relation to social rights whose justiciability had been
challenged by certain members of the ConventionY7 The
differences between the supported positions are explained by
the different political sensibilities8 and distinct constitutional
traditions regarding the existence and scope of subjective and
objective rights, in particular social rights.6-
64. Article 53(3) of the Spanish Constitution states: "El reconocimiento, el
respeto y la prottcci6n de los principios reconocidos en el Capftulo tercero inforinarin
la legislacion positiva, la practicajudicial y ]a actuacion de los poderes pfiblicos. Solo
podran ser alegados ante la Jurisdicci6n ordinaria de acuerdo con lo que dispongan las
leyes que los desarrollen." (ONSTITUCI(ON ESPANOLA. B.O.E. N. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art.
53 (Spain). An English translation is available at SPANISH (ONSTITUTION art. 53, at 15,
http://wwi .snado.es/coinstitu-i/indices/consti-ing.pdf ("Recognition, respect and
protection of the principles recognized in Chapter 3 shall guide legislation, judicial
practice and actions by public authorities. They may only be invoked before the
ordinary courts in accordance with the legal provisions implementing them.").
65. See BRAIBANT, supra note 7, at 46, 85; see also Ladenburger, supra note 63, at
780-81.
66. See Ladenburger, supra note 63, at 780-81, 1[[ 7-10.
67. These discussions had resulted tiom the conclusions of the 1999 Cologne
European Council, according to which the Charter was to contain economic and social
rights and not norns that only constituted objective rights. See Benoit-Rohmer, supra
note 9, at 1485; see also Borowsky, supra note 18, at 535-36, 543;Jacqu, supra note 9, at
5; Ladenburger, sopra note 63, at 780-81, 7.
68. See BRABANT, supra note 7, at 74.
69. For example, there are constitutional concepts that distinguish between fully
justiciable subjective rights and "programmatic rights," which are entirely injusticiable
(see IR. CONST. 1937, art. 45) or justiciable to a limited extent (see (ONSTtTLC()N
EsPANoL-oA, B.O.E. N. 311, Dec. 29. 1978, art. 53(3) (Spain)) even [hough these
distinctions are made subjectively, whereas the fundamental law of Germany is based
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Moreover, Article 52 (5) did not appear in the initial version
of the Charter that was presented at the Nice summit of
December 2000 and was added during the Treaty negotiations
establishing a European Constitution as proposed by the
European Convention.70 This addition allowed the United
Kingdom to overcome its reluctance towards the insertion of the
Charter in the constitutional project and concluded the
deliberations regarding the development of the Charter.71 It
should confirm the distinction between rights and principles
provided by the Charter in the preamble and Ar ticle 51(1),
second sentence (Article 1li11 (1), of the constitutional project)
and clarify the judicial nature of the principles7 2 while
reinforcing legal certainty.7,
The Charter does not characterize individual articles as
being constitutive of rights, principles or both. In accordance
with the intention of the Convention, such a characterization is
incumbent upon future jurisprudence that shall also consider
the directions found in the explanations.74 Articles 25, 26, and
37 are listed as recognized principles under the Charter in
explanations related to Article 52(5). In addition, the
explanations also provide that the Charter may contain elements
of both a right and a principle, for example, Articles 23, 33, and
34.75 Moreover, Articles 35, 36, and 38 can also be characterized
as principles based on their respective wording and relevant
explanations.76
The characterization of the articles of the Charter as either
principles, rights, or both is not an easy task. One is particularly
faced with the question as to what standards of analysis should
on a narrow understanding of rights, limited to justiciable individual rights. See
Ladenburger, supra note 63, at 780-81, 1 7; see also id. at 765 nn.40-43.
70. Ladenburger, supa note 63, at 780, 1 6.
71. See id. at 781-81. 7.
72. See Borowsky, supra note 18, at 573; see also TRIDIMAS, supra note 36, at 367.
73. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION WORKING GRP. II, CONV 354/02, INCORPORATION
OF THL CHARTER/ACCESSION To THL EC HR: FINAL RLPORT 8 (2002).
74. See id.; see also EU NIF,-ORK OF IN)FP. EXPERTS ON FINDAMENTAI RIGHTS,
supra note 35. at 407-08.
75. Explanations relevant to this Essay reveal that Paragraphs 1 and 3 should be
considered principles.
76. See Koen Lenacrts, La Solidarite ou le Chapitre IV de la Charte des Droits
Fondamentaux de I'Union Europeenne, 82 RIXUE TRIMLSTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMML
217, 225-26 (2010).
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be applied to such a characterization. Given the wording of
Article 52(5), the relevant explanations, and the origin of the
distinction between "rights" and "principles" in the Charter, it
seems clear that they do not confer a subjective right that can be
invoked by individuals, 77 an observation that serves as the point
of departure for any analysis. In this regard, the explanations
can offer useful suggestions, at least in some cases. Additionally,
at the time of the Convention deliberations, it was emphasized
that the wording of the Charter provisions should provide
important suggestions for criteria under which to analyze
whether something is a right or a principle.7S The same applies
to the genesis of the articles and their respective goals. A certain
degree of precision in applying an article is essential, as is the
need for codification of its content by the legislature.79
Regarding the legal effects and their implications for
judicial review of a violation of rights or principles, the fact that
the provisions mentioned above do not confer subjective rights
that can be invoked by individuals implies that they only have
limited justiciability.80 Certainly, the views regarding the extent
of the distinction between full justiciabilitv of fundamental
rights and a limited justiciability of principles are divergent.
Nonetheless, it would mean that principles should be taken into
account at the time of the review of the legality of secondary
legislation as well as at the time of the interpretation of
secondary legislation and Member State legislation that is
implementing EU law.81 However, the principles neither include
rights for their implementation by the legislatures of the
European Union or Member States, and thus positive benefits,
nor do they confer standing to take legal action. Furthermore,
the right to an effective remedy, as provided for under Article 47
77. SeeJacqu6, supra note 11. at 115; see also EU NLTWORK OF INDEP. EXPLRTS ON
FU NDAMENTAL RIGHTS, sup a note 35, at 407; Lenaerts, supra note 76, at 224; Prechal,
supra note 63. at 179.
78. See Ladenburger, supra note 63, at 806-07, [ 98.
79. SeeJacqu6, supra note 11, at 114; see also Iadenburger, supra note 63, at 806-
07, [ 98.
80. See Jacqu, supbn ote 11, at 115; see also EU NLTWORK OF INDEP. EXPLRTS ON
FU NDAMENTAL RIGHTS, spra note 35, at 407; Lenaerts, supra note 76, at 224.
81. in this contxt, the question is whether certain measures should be designed
to implement the invoked principle. See Prechal, supra note 63, at 179; see also EU
NETWORK OF INDEP. EXPFRTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, s ura note 35, at 407.
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of the Charter, does not result in, or serve as the basis for, a
claim for damages based on the noncontractual liability of the
European Union under Article 340(2) of the TFEU, or the
noncontractual liability of Member States for a violation of a
principle.82
It can be argued that the Court will grant to the legislature
of the European Union, as well as to the national legislatures,
within the limits set by EU law, a large margin of appreciation
with regard to the implementation of a principle, so that the
extent of judicial review might, in the end, be limited to
manifest errors of law.
IV. THE LIMITATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Contrary to the ECHR, which enumerates specific
limitations in each article, Article 52(1) of the Charter includes
a general limitations clause which cumulatively refers to the
legality of limitations on the exercise of rights and freedoms
recognized by the Charter." There are certain conditions on the
general limitation found in the Charter;8 4 a limitation of those
rights and freedoms8 5 must respect their substance as well as the
principle of proportionality and, in this context, pursue
particular objectives. This general limitations clause also applies
to rights and freedoms that are defined in Article 52(3).8A As a
result, the rights that correspond to the ECHR are subject to the
82. See Ladenburger, supa note 63, at 804, 1 86; see also Lenaerts, supra note 76, at
224.
83. In principle, this clause should not be applied to principles given heir legal
nature as well as the wording of Article 52( 1), which only refers to rights.
84. See Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villal6n, Scarlet Extended SA v. Socidtd
Belge des Autcurs Coinpositcurs et Editcurs. Case C-70/10. [2011] E.C.R. I , 1[1[ 93-
1 13 (delivered kpr. 14, 2011) (not yet reported).
85. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-271/08. [2010] E.C.R. 1-7091, [ 47; see also
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Germany, Case C-543/09. [2011] E.C.R. I1, [ 66
(delivered May 5, 2011) (not vet reported); j.Mcll. v. I.E., Case C-400/10, [2010]
E.C.R. I , 5 37 (delivered Oct. 5, 2010) (not yet reported).
86. See jMcB.. [2010] E.C.R. 1 1[1[ 53, 59, where the application of Article
52 (1), regarding a right recognized by the Charter corresponds to a right provided fbr
by the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). Certain authors propose
that it does not apply to rights that are found in the treatics as well as rights that
correspond to the ECHR. Seeg e.g, STEFAN BARRIGA, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER CHARTA DER
GRUNDRECHTE DER EUROPAISCHLN UNION: EINL ANALYSL DER ARBLTLN IM KONVLNT
UND KOMLPETENZRLCHTL1CHLR FR.ALN 157 (2003); RLNGELING & SZCZEKA-LL-,, supra
note 35, at 255, 260, It 463, 473; llorowsky, spra note 18, at 556.
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limitations set by the ECHR.87 However, the ECHR does not
apply to rights derived from the Treaties, which are only subject
to the conditions and limitations defined by those Treaties
(Article 52(2) of the Charter). The Court has not vet
adjudicated any matter regarding the interpretation of the
general limitations clause in Article 52(1). However, as it
emanates from the explanations, this clause is influenced by the
jurisprudence of the Court on fundamental rights according to
which "restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those
rights.. .provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do
not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the
very substance of those rights."88
In view of the fact that the general limitations clause is a
unique creation of the Charter, it should be interpreted in an
autonomous manner, taking into consideration the
jurisprudence of the Court related to the review of the principle
of proportionality in the context of fundamental rights."- In this
context, the principle of proportionality requires an
87. Sec the relevant explanations to Article 52 according to which paragraph
three of this Essay intends to ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and
the ECHR, insofar as the rights included in the Charter correspond to those
guaranteed by the ECHR. meaning that these rights should be applied in accordance
with the limitations defined in the ECHR, unless it impedes upon the autonomy of EU
law and the Court. However, in accordance with Article 53 of the Charter, if the clause
ol'limitations in paragraph one applies to the rights recognized by the E(HR, such an
application cannot lead to an inferior degree of protection than the one found in the
ECHR. In reality, a tension could result from the lact that the conditions that must be
met under the review of principle of proportionality under the ECHR, which is closely
linked to the specific limitations on the exercise of a particular right, and the
requirements of Aiticle 52(1) of the Charter are different. In principle, an eventual
conflict resulting from such different conditions should be rcsolved by an application
leading to a much increased degree of protection of the fundanicntal right in question.
See Thomas von Danwitz, Artikel 53 GRCh (Art. II-113 lIE) Sch ,ve--, in K0NER
GLMLINSCHAITSKOMMENTAR ZUR EUROP,SCHEN GRUNDRECHTE-CHARTA, supra note 7,
at 815, 819, 821, 12, 19.
88. Wachauf v. Bundesamt lur Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88, [1989]
E.C. R. 2609, IS; see IL-rlsson, Case C-292/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-2737. 45.
89. Clearly, the jurisprudence of the European Court of H-luman Rights should be
taken into consideration when a question deals with rights recognized by the Charter
that also correspond to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. In accordance with Article
52(1), the meaning and the scope of the rights are the same as those conferred by the
ECHR, unless the degree of protection offered by the Charter is broader.
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examination of a measure's ability to achieve a pursued
objective and its necessity, as well as its appropriateness." The
latter entails an evaluation determining whether the
disadvantages resulting from the measure in question are not
disproportionate to the aims pursued, 9' and examining whether
the means applied by that measure to achieve its aim
correspond to its importance.92  Thus, this determination
involves a cost-benefit analysis of the measures in question, and
particularly an evaluation of the importance attributed to the
protected fundamental right that has been limited9 3
In the context of the examination of the principle of
proportionality, one must determine what kind of objectives may
be pursued by a measure limiting a right recognized by the
Charter. According to Ar ticle 52(1) of the Charter, limitations
may be made "to protect the rights and freedoms of others"' 4 as
well as based on "objectives of general interest recognised by the
Union." This last notion includes, among others, public order,
public security, and public health 95 The Court accepts that
different levels and systems of protection among Member States
exist,b which may influence the balancing of these interests.7
90. See Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte British Am. Tobacco (Invs.)
Ltd., Case C-491/01. [2002] E.C.R. 1-11,453. [[ 149-53.
91. See the traditional jurisprudence of the Court regarding the principle of
proportionality: Afton Chem. Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., Case C-343/09, [2010]
E.C.R. 1-7023, 1[ 45: Miier Fleisch GinbI v. Land Baden-Wlrttmberg, Case C-562/08.
[2010] E.C.R. 1-1391, [ 43; and Hermann Schrader HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG,
Ochtrup v. Hauptzollamt (,ronau, Case 265/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2263, 15.
92. See the traditional jurisprudence of the Court regarding the principle of
proportionality: Otto Pressler Weingut-Weingrosskellerei GinbHI & (o. KG v. Germany,
Case C-319/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-203, 12; Firma Otto lingenielser v. (ermany, Case C-
118/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2637. [ 12: Denkavit France SARL v. Fonds d'Orientation t de
Rcgularisation des Marchds Agricoles (FORMA), Case 266/84, [1986] E.C.R. 149, [ 17:
Fromancais SA v. Fonds d'Orientation et de Rdgularisation des Marches Agricoles
(FORMA), Case 66/82, [1983] E.C.R. 1-395, [ 8.
93. See Sec'y of State fir Health. ex parte British Am. Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd., [2002]
E.C.R. 1-I11,453, 1[1' 149-53.
94. in this regard, the Charter is inspired by Article 31 of the European Social
Charter. SeeEropean Social Charter art. 31, Oct. 18. 1961. 529 U.N.T.S. 89. 120.
95. See the explanations that state that the general interest recognized by the
Union covers the objctive mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union
("TEU") and other interests protected by specific provisions of the treaties, such as
Article 4(l) of the TEU and Articles 35(3), 36, and 346 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. Charter Explanations, supra note 17, at 32.
96. According to de following case law. Member States remain free to determine,
in accordance with their national needs, requirements of the public order. See Comm'n
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The Court also has recognized, on the basis of a provision of
secondary legislation, that Member States have the authority to
establish a balance among the different fundamental rights that
the European Union aims to guarantee under the CharterY8
Consequently, requirements of national law may prove to be
pertinent at the time of the interpretation of the general
limitations clause.
V. MUL TIPLICA TION OF SOURCES OF FU'ADAMENTAL
RIGHTS: WHAT IS THE RELA TIONSI1P AMONG THE
CHARTER, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, COMMOIN
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS, AND CONVENTIONAL
RIGHTS?
A principal concern for the daily application of
fundamental rights by national courts and the ECJ is the
multiplication of sources of fundamental rights that is apparent
from an initial reading of the Charter. Related to the problem of
multiplication of sources is the question of consistency of
fundamental rights protection for the individual.
A. Fundamental Rights Protection in a Sstem of Multilevel
Governance
Clearly, there is a general issue related to the three levels of
fundamental rights protection in Europe: national legal systems,
which sometimes have a two-stage protection system offered by
federated entities and federal states; the legal order of the
European Union; and the subsidiary system of the ECHR.
Ensuring a certain level of consistency in the degree of
fundamental rights protection among these different systems is
of the Eur. Cntys. v. Italy, Case C-326/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-2291, 1 70; Commn'n of the
Eur. Cants. v. Luxembourg, Case C-319/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4323. [ 50; Ministerul
Administratiei si Internelor-Directia Generala de Pasapoarte lucuresti v.Jipa, Case -
33/07. [2008] E.C.R. 1-5157. [ 23: Assoc. Eglisc de Scientologic de Paris v. Prine
Minister, Case C-54/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1335. 1 17; Rutili v. Ministre de 'Intdricur,
Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, 26-28; see also Sayn-Wittgensmtein v. von Wien, Case
C-208/09- [2010] E.C.R. I . 87 (delivered Dec. 22, 2010) (not yet reported);
Onega Spielhallen-und Autiomatenauftelhtngs-GmbH v. Oberbfirgerimcisterin der
Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609, It 37, 38.
97. See San-Wittgenstein, [2010] E.C.R. I ; Omega. [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609. [ 38.
98. See ProductLores de Misica de Espana (Promnusicae) v. Tclefonica de Espafia
SAI, Case C-275/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-271, 68.
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crucially important to the acceptance of a strong European
fundamental rights jurisprudence by the national judiciaries. In
general terms, it would certainly be detrimental to the
functioning of fundamental rights protection in Europe if the
different courts involved in the process entered into a
competition for "who grants the best fundamental rights
protection." Furthermore, a maximum level of protection for
the exercise of one fundamental right usually occurs at the cost
of another. A race to the top for one fundamental right would
inevitably lead to a race to the bottom for another. In addition
to this problem of trying to attain the "right" level of
fundamental rights protection, such a judicial competition
would inevitably lead to an institutional quest for leadership in
fundamental rights protection. That kind of evolution would not
only incentivize detrimental forum shopping for fundamental
rights protection in Europe, but, most importantly, it would
neglect the fundamental necessity for the preservation of
traditional differences in fundamental rights protection that
result from national traditions, cultural specificities, and
historical evolution leading to a specific conditioning of the
legal culture of one or more Member States. There are plenty of
examples in that respect: the concept of human dignity,99 the so-
called armed democracy in the basic law of Germany, "I" the laws
on nobility in Austria,""1 the status of the Catholic Church under
the constitution of Poland,10 2 and the particular importance
attributed to the principle of laicit6 by the French
constitution. 10 " In such circumstances, the "required" protection
of fundamental rights is deeply linked to a respect for the
constitutional identity of Member States as required by Article
99. See Omega, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609, It 34-38.
100. See Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S MEIW & Roj TV A/S v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Joined Cases C-244-245/10, [2011] E.C.R. I , 50-51 (delivered
Sept. 22, 2011) (not yet reported).
101. See Sayn -Wittgenstein, [2010] E.C.R. 1 . 88.
102. Se R0NS1TTCJA R7EC7YPOSP TF:J PO SKIF:J [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997,
DZLLNNIK USTAW RLEPUBLIKI POLSILEJ [GOVELNMENT RLGULATIONS AND LAWs GAZETTE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND] No. 78, Item 483, art. 25(4), iP connection with the
SOIIEMNIS CONENTIO: INTER APOSTOi CAM SEDEM ET PO1ONIAE REM PL -BLICAM
[Concordat Between the Holy See and tire Republic of Poland], July 28. 1993. XC
A.A.S., no. 2, 1998, at 310.
103. See 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.).
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4(2) of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") 104 and as the
requirement for subsidiarity of fundamental rights is
understood. In essence, the respect for a certain level of
consistency in the jurisprudence on fundamental rights of
different courts in Europe is as important as the respect for a
certain degree of diversity in fundamental rights protection
resulting from the major differences in the constitutional
traditions of Member States.
B. In Search of a Consistent Approach in Union Law
There is another basic question in daily jurisprudential
practice that is related to the consistency of fundamental rights
protection in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. It results from the
multiplication of legal sources of fundamental rights that are
respected by the EU legal order itself. The wording of Aiticle 6
of the TEU' °5 does not prevent EU law from providing more
extensive protection. From a more general point of view, Article
53 of the Charter states that nothing in the Charter shall be
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms as recognized by EU law,
international law, international agreements to which the
European Union or all Member States are party, including the
ECHR, and the constitutions of Member States. °11 Article 52(4)
and (6) elaborate further that the Charter rights shall be
interpreted in harmony with constitutional traditions common
to the Member States and, furthermore, that full account shall
be taken of national laws and practices as specified in the
Charter. 17 However, the essential question remains unanswered
by these provisions: how the ECJ will cope with the challenge of
interpreting potentially conflicting provisions found in the
ECHR, other international agreements, and national
constitutions, if conciliation cannot be achieved. It seems that
these Charter provisions are focused on the realization of a
104. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4, 2010 OJ.
C 83/01, at 18 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
105. See id. art. 6, at 19.
106. See Charter of Rights, supra note 6, art. 53. 2010 O4. C 83, at 403.
107. See id. arts. 52(4), 52(6), at 44.
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maximum standard of one fundamental right,108 but neglect the
state of conflicting fundamental rights of different parties in
multipolar relations. The rules contained in the Charter are of
no real assistance in those circumstances, but nonetheless they
allow for one to conclude that the ECJ should exercise its
mandate in a twofold orientation; the level of fundamental
rights protection provided by the ECHR international law,
international agreements, or national constitutions shall not be
restricted. Moreover, the balancing of conflicting interests
should be conducted in a manner that allows for the
optimization of fundamental rights protection.9 It goes without
saying that the openness of the Charter provisions in this respect
leaves room for a genuine debate between the national courts
and the ECJ within the framework ofjudicial cooperation via the
preliminary reference proceeding under Article 267 of the
TFEU.
V1. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE
APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER
In judicial practice, the significance of the Charter depends
to a large extent on the way in which national courts will
proceed with the Charter's application. Preliminary rulings since
December 2009 have shown that, in general, national courts do
not show any reluctance to apply the Charter rights and are
willing to explore the scope and meaning of its provisions by
making use of the preliminary proceeding.10 It might therefore
108. See generally Leonard F.M. Besselink, Entrapped by the Waximam Standard: On
Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union, 35 COMMON MKT.
L. Rv. 629 (1998).
109. See von L)anwitz, sup a note 87, at 821, 11 19-2 1.
110. See, e.g., Samba Diouf v. Ministrc du 'Travail, de L'Enploi ct de
lIminigration, Case C-69/10, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered July 28, 2011) (not yCt
reported); Ass'n Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Conseil des Ministres,
Case C-236/09. [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered Mar. 1, 2011) (not yet reported);
Aguirrc Zarraga v. Pclz, C-491/10, [2010] E.C.R. I (delivered Dec. 22, 2010) (not
yet reported); Asparuhov Estov v. Ministerski saver na Republika Bulgaria, Case -
339/10, [2010] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 12, 2010) (not yct reported); J.McB. v.
L.E., Case C-400/10, [2010] E.C.R. 1 [ 132-34. 51-52 (delivered Oct. 5, 2010)
(not yet reported); Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Shecke & Eilert v. Land
Hcscn. Joined Cases C-92-93/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1 3[56-58 (delivered June 17,
2010) (not yCL reported); see also Domingucz v. Centre Intformatiquc du Centre OuCs[
Atlantique, Case C-282/10, [2012] F.C.R. I , 12-14 (delivered jan. 24, 2012)
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be quite useful to highlight some major procedural questions
relating to the application of the Charter.
A. Procedural Fomidations of the Jzdicial Review of the Charter
One should first note that the Charter does not contain any
specific rules on the procedural treatment of questions relating
to the Charter as compared with those relating to EU law in
general. Notably, there is no explicit requirement that national
judges review the validity or lawfulness of an act in relation to
the Charter rights ex officio. Therefore, it appears reasonable to
apply the jurisprudence of the ECJ regarding the requirement
for ex officio review of EU law, in general, to the rights granted
by the Charter.1 1 Accordingly, EU law does not require national
jurisdictions to exercise an ex officio review of a violation of EU
law. Yet, if national jurisdictions are under the obligation of
national law to exercise such a review ex officio, or have the
ability to do so, they are obliged to proceed accordingly with
respect to a binding provision of EU law.112
As a matter of principle, the effectiveness of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter requires that
national judges give direct effect to the provisions of the
Charter,' 3 irrespective of whether the Charter provision
contains a right or a principle. Accordingly, national judges have
to exercise an exhaustive review in that respect. As for the
consequences of this review, it has to be noted that general rules
of EU law apply in this respect as well. The principle of primacy
requires that national law be interpreted in accordance with a
fundamental right granted by the Charter and as interpreted by
(not yet reported); Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, M.E. v. Reftgee
Applications Commr. Case C-493/10. [2010] E.C.R. I 1[ 38 (delivered Sept. 22,
2011) (not yet reported); Opinion of Advocate General Trstenak, N.S.v. Sec'y of State
tor the Home Dep't, Case C-411/10, [2010] E.C.R. 1 [[ 1. 4-5, 51-53 (delivered
Sept. 22, 2011) (not yet reported); Reference tor a Preliminary Ruling, ZZ v. Sec'y of
State for the Home I)ep't, Case C-300/1 1 (une 11, 2011).
111. See, e.g., Martfn Marthn v. EDP Editores SL, Case C-227/08, [2009] E.C.R.
1-11939, [[ 19-20; Willy Kcmpter KG v. Hauptzollamt Hamnburg Jonas. Case C-2/06,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-411, 1 45; J. Van der Weerd v. Minister van ILandbouw, Natur en
Vocdselkwalitcit, Joined Cases C-222-25/05. [2007] E.C. 1-4249, [ 36.
112. See WillY Kernpte, [2008] E.(.R 1-411, [ 45.
113. See ladenburger, surpa note 7, at 762, 1 10.
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the Court in order to attain the result envisioned by EU law. 11 4 If
an interpretation in conformity with Union law requirements is
not feasible, national judges are under the obligation to apply
the law of the European Union in its entirety, and to protect the
rights conferred upon individuals by EU law by refusing to apply
any provision of the conflicting national law."
B. Methods of Interpretation
According to Article 6(1) of the TEU and Article 52(7) of
the Charter, the explanations have to be taken into
consideration for the interpretation of the Charter. I 16So far, the
Court has made an explicit reference to these provisions in only
one case." 7 Beyond their practical value, the explanations raise
the questions of whether and, eventually, to what extent, the
interpretation of the Charter rights requires a specific
methodology.
The particular importance attributed to the explanations by
the treaty and the Charter, however, does not provide a
convincing reason to derogate from the traditional methods of
interpretation.118 In particular, the interpretation based on the
wording of a provision, which constitutes the method of
interpretation most frequently used by the Court,119 and,
according to its teleology, will continue to be used. Nonetheless,
the particular importance accorded to the genesis of the
Charter and its different provisions as evidenced by the
obligation to take the explanations of the Charter into account
will be relevant for the way in which different methods of
114. See, e.g., Criminal Proceeings Against X, Case C-60/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-665,
59; Murphy v. Bord Telecom Eireann, Case 157/86. [1988] E.C.R. 686, 1[ 11.
115. See, e.g., Land Oberbsterreich v. (lEZ as, Case C- 15/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-
10265, 140; Frigerio Luigi & C. Snc v. Comune di Triuggio, Case C-357/06. [2007]
E.C.R. 1-1231 1, 28; ITC Innovative Tech. Ctr. GtnBH v. Bundesagentur fir Aibeit,
Case C-208/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-181, 69.
116. TEU post-I sbon, supra note 104, art. 6(1), 2010 O:]. C 83, at 19; Charter of
Rights, supra note 6, art. 52(7), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 403.
117. See DEB Deutsche Energiehandels-und Beratungsgeselschaft mbH v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-279/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1 [[ 32. 35-36. 39
(delivered on Dec. 22, 2010) (no yet reported).
118. Those methods are interpretation particularly according to the wording, the
system, the origins, and the teleology of a standard.
119. See Mariele Dederichs, Die Methodik des Gerichtshofes der Europdischen
Geneinshaften, 39 EUROPARECHT 345, 349 (2004).
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interpretation might be used and even how they might be
interrelated. Of course, the obligation to take the explanations
into account under Article 6(1) of the TEU and Article 52(7) of
the Charter does not go beyond a procedural necessity and does
not oblige the Court to follow the reasoning provided in the
explanation, or even to adopt a specific interpretation. In our
view, it would not be justified to adopt a formally binding
ranking system for different methods of interpretation or even
to generally give priority to an interpretation according to
genesis. It would certainly run counter to the explicit reference
to take into account the explanations and the genesis, if an
interpretation left out these elements and did not give
convincing reasons for a different method of interpretation.
Finally, it should be noted that Article 52(4) and (6) of the
Charter require, under given circumstances, an interpretation
that takes into account common constitutional traditions of the
Member States and national laws and practices. 12 In essence,
the explicit reference to the explanations and thereby to the
genesis of the Charter should be understood as a general
reminder to interpret the provisions of the Charter only on the
basis of a sound methodology.
C. Horizontal Direct Effiect
Finally, the question of whether the fundamental rights of
the Charter convey a horizontal direct effect should be
addressed, though it has not yet been answered by the Court.21
Given the far-reaching provisions in Chapter IV of the Charter
on "solidarity," the recognition of a horizontal direct effect
would undoubtedly have significant consequences both for legal
traditions of some Member States, which have so far been rather
120. Even before the Charter came into force, the Court-s jurisprudence on
fundamental rights had been influenced by constitutional traditions common to all
Member States, as well as guidelines found in international instrunents concerning the
protection of human rights that the Member States cooperated in or adhered to. See
Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophones v. Conseil des Ministres, Case -
305/05, [2007] ECR 1-5305. 1 29; see also Ka-di v. Council & Commission, Joined Cases
(-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. 1-6351. 283.
121. Cf Kficfikdeveci v. Swedex (GmBlH & Co. KG, Case C-555/07, [2010] E.C.R.I-
365; Mangold v. Helim, Case C-144/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981, 1[ 77. Both cases
acknowledged a horizontl direct effect to Lhe general principle of nondiscrimination.
substantiated by Directive 2000/78.
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reluctant to recognize the horizontal direct effects of
fundamental rights, 1 s2 and for the social partners involved. In
addition, a direct horizontal effect of the fundamental freedoms
under the Treaty has only been recognized in exceptional
circumstances.' 21 The same applies to general principles of EU
law 124 and the directives. 25 At a first glance, it would therefore
seem plausible to argue that the recognition of a horizontal
direct effect of the Charter would have necessitated an explicit
provision, at least under the provisions on "solidarity." In
particular, the cautious distinction between rights and principles
would seem much less conclusive under the conditions of
122. This is, in principle, the case in Austrian, German, and Spanish law. See as
for German law, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BcrfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
jan. 15, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES IBUNI)ESERFASSUNGS;ERICHTS [1VERF(GE] 198
(205); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BNerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 14,
1973, 34 ENTSCHLIDUNGEN DLS BUNDLSVLRASSUNGSGLRICHTS [BVLRGE] 269 (271);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [l!Verf(;] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 25, 1979, 52
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES T,-NI)ESVERFASSUNGS(GFRICHTS [IIVERF(;E] 131 (173); Hans-
.JOrgan Papier, Drittwirkung der G u-dre'chte, in 2 HAINDBUCH DER GRUNDRLCHTL IN
I)EUTSCHLAND U-N) EUROPA § 55, at 133l (I)etlef Merten & Hans-jfirgen Papier eds.,
2006). See as tor Austrian law, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Die Allgenteine Stukturen der
Grundrechte, in HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRLCHTL IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EURoPA § 187, at
49, It 44-45, 70-71 (I)etlef Merten & Hans-jfirgen Papier eds., 2009), whereby the
Austrian Constitution comprises certain fundanental rights that explicitly provide fir a
horizontal direct effect. See as fir Spanish Law, Josep Ferrer i Riba & Pablo Salvador
Coderch, 1erei"ganger, Denok( atie urd Drittwirkurg; ir ZUR DRITTWTRKUNG DER
GRUNDRECHTE 15-135 (Pablo Salvador Coderch et al. eds., 1998). In that context, it
also should be noted that certain Member States consider social rights to be
nonjusticiable and therelore it can be concluded that in those Member States a
horizontal direct effect is at least excluded as to social rights. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
123. See Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska lyggnadsarbetarelorbundet, Case C-
341/05, [2007] E.C.R 1-11.767. 98; Union Royale Belge des Socictes de Football Ass'n
(ASBL) v. Bosmnan, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R 1-4921, 1[ 83-84124. See Q@een v.
Minish
" 
qfAgric., Fisheries & Food, ex parte Bostock, Case C-2/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-95o, and
Otto BV v. Postbank Ni Case C-60/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5683, where the Court denied
such an effect under the circumstances found in the case at hand. See also Kfidikdeveci.
[2010] E.C.R. I365, where the Court allowed such an eflet.
124. See Queen v. Viinistry of Ag'ic., Fisheries &. Food, ex parte Bostock, Case C-2/92,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-955, and Otto BV v. Postbank NV, Case C-60/92. [1993] E.C.R. 1-5683,
where the Court denied such an eflect under the circumstances lound in the case at
hand. See also Kici~kdeveci. [2010] E.C.R. 1-365. where the Court allowed such an effect.
125. See Criminal Proceedings Against Silvio Berlusconi & Others, Joined Cases C-
387/02, C-391/02 & C-403/02, [2005] E.C.R. 1-3565; Criminal Proceedings Against
Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV. Case 80/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3969, 1[1 10. 13; Marshall v.
Southampton & Sw. Hampshire Area Health Auth., Case 152/84. [1986] E.C.R. 723;
Pubblico Minisero v. Ratti, Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629.
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horizontal direct effect. Finally, the limited scope of application
of the Charter, which is triggered by the implementation of
another act of EU law according to Ar ticle 51 (1), would make it
rather difficult for national legislatures to enact legislation in
compliance with fundamental rights of the Charter' 26 and, in
particular, for private parties to assess the extent to which they
would be under an obligation resulting from the horizontal
direct effect of charter rights. Currently, it is far from possible to
give a certain answer to this major question. To the contrary, it
seems quite likely that the importance of the question will lead
to a preliminary request to the Court, sooner rather than later.
CONCL USION
The case law of the Court on fundamental rights granted by
the Charter has evolved significantly after the Charter's entry
into force. Even though major questions of horizontal impact
remain unanswered, some of them will come before the Court
in due course. So far, the Court has not shown any reluctance to
address major questions, if there was a necessity to answer them.
It is likely that the Court will soon enter into a decisive phase
with respect to fundamental rights, in which conceptual
foundations will be laid. While the recent jurisprudence shows
promising signs that the high level of protection envisaged by
Article 53 of the Charter will indeed be realized in practice, it
seems that the Court will have to answer the most crucial
questions relating to the "federal" issues on the applicability of
the Charter. It goes without saving that this might, after all, be
decisive for the acceptance of the Court's jurisprudence in the
long run.
126. See Iadenburger, supra note 7, at 762, 112-14.
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